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8 Beirut
Metropolis of Darkness and the Politics of 
Urban Electricity Grids
Eric Verdeil
Introduction
Despite massive investment in infrastructure reconstruction, Beirut has never fully 
recovered 24/7 provision of electricity after the civil war (1975–90). Since 2006, 
partly as a result of Israeli bombings, infrastructure decay has worsened the situ-
ation. In addition, an atmosphere of political bickering in the country has delayed 
the implementation of new projects. Lighting for the majority of households 
(93 per cent) is supplied through a publicly owned transmission and distribution 
grid run by the state utility Electricité du Liban (EDL) (Central Administration 
of Statistics, 2008). However, on average, electricity is supplied for only half of 
the day, severely affecting the daily life of the city’s nearly two million habitants, 
who are forced to cope with extended periods of darkness and generalised power 
failures. As a result, across the majority of the population and through all facets 
of urban life, electricity Àows have been substantially reorganised around alterna-
tive informal electrical grids running on privately owned small- scale generators. 
7hese emerging Àows, crafted to cope with the pervasive reality of power cuts, 
build new infrastructural, social and political dynamics in the city. The multiple 
facets of electricity and its shortages have become the subject of heightened con-
troversies in the political arena, fuelling various forms of political mobilisation 
and challenging government policies in several crucial areas. The domains at stake 
transcend the very materiality of power cuts, including the management of utility 
workers in an era of neoliberalisation as well as struggles for power and con-
trol over the privately owned and informally established electricity generators 
now powering the city. Unfolding protests centred on electricity have taken to the 
street, threatening the nation’s political order, the unity of the country and, seem-
ingly, its very existence (Figure 8.1).
Researching electricity crises in Lebanon poses unique dilemmas given their 
embeddeness in everyday life. In Beirut, like in many other cities of the global 
South, everyday infrastructural interruptions – such as power outages, traffic con-
gestion and road blocks – represent a ‘new normality’ (McFarlane, 2010). Yet, 
as McFarlane (2010: 133) suggests, such ‘everyday forms of interruption have 
received relatively little attention in urban studies’. Beirut’s electricity crisis, as 
an everyday force, has become a major factor in the (re)production of the uneven 
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geography of the city. Through this, it produces a new urban politics, the subject 
of this chapter. As McFarlane and Rutherford argue, ‘the politics underpinning 
urban infrastructural transformation are rarely more evident or visible than in 
times of crisis or rupture’ (2008: 6). The electricity crisis is openly contested in the 
‘back alleyways’ of the city (Bayat, 2009: 11) as much as in Parliament, on social 
networks through cyber- mobilisation, and on the streets through public demon-
strations. This chapter thus questions how these new forms of electric ‘politics’ 
reframe broader ‘political’ domains in the city (Swyngedouw, 2011). In doing so, 
the chapter is in line with approaches which, within urban and infrastructure stud-
ies, displace the centrality of regulatory reform and the governance of the sector 
(Graham & Marvin, 2001; Coutard, 2008). Rather, its concern lies in an analysis 
of the impacts of infrastructure policies on the social fabric of cities (Monstadt, 
2009; Jaglin & Verdeil, 2013; Rutherford & Coutard, 2014), unpacking issues of 
energy justice (Bickerstaff et al., 2013), particularly at an urban scale.
Consistent with other academic accounts of the politics of urban infrastruc-
tures (Heynen et al., 2006; McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008; Graham, 2010), the 
uneven geography of electricity supply in Beirut reproduces existing social and 
Figure 8.1 A smelting Lebanon, lit by candle
Source: Abdelhalim Hammoud (used with permission)
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political hierarchies. It favours the city of Beirut and its richer population over 
that of its suburbs whilst also reinforcing the political and sectarian lines that 
divide the country. The main objective of this chapter is to analyse the forms of 
mobilisation and politicisation around electricity issues in Beirut, recognising the 
centrality of the material and spatial dimensions of the infrastructure network in 
these emerging forms of social protest. Here infrastructure acts to redistribute the 
agencies of power in the city, contesting existing social and political hierarchies 
and prompting the emergence of new, alternative but precarious, configurations 
of power. Such a novel configuration can be further understood through Timothy 
Mitchell’s notion of a ‘power from within the energy system’ (Mitchell, 2011: 12), 
in this case via the city’s electricity grid. This involves reflecting on the grid’s 
political geography and examining the articulation of how urban politics shape 
grid politics. The main body of the chapter is divided into four sections. The first, 
drawing on the work of Mitchell (2011) and Cupples (2011), proposes a frame-
work for analysing the politicisation of infrastructure in cities. This is followed by 
a geographical analysis of the social and political context of the Lebanese elec-
tricity crisis, highlighting the prevailing uneven access to electrical power and the 
resulting street protests that, with little success, have occurred during the last ten 
years. The third section examines the different forms of protest and dissent that, 
by drawing on its material and relational properties, are entangled in the electricity 
grid. Specifically, two forms of grid- embedded resistance are examined, both rep-
resenting what has been termed as ‘the end of the [electricity] line’: the ability of 
electricity workers to disrupt the system through strikes and the capacity of users 
to establish forms of passive resistance through meter tampering. The fourth sec-
tion scrutinises the new social and power relationships built around alternative and 
informal electricity networks based on private generators. Finally, the conclusion 
elaborates a typology based on various combinations of grid and urban politics.
The chapter’s empirical material consists of interviews with a variety of 
stakeholders within the Lebanese electricity industry. This included representa-
tives of public and private electricity companies, civic and industry associations, 
political parties, government and municipal officers, consultants, informal entre-
preneurs operating the emerging network of generators and electricity users. 
These interviews were complemented with an analysis of official documentation, 
data provided by the utility company and a review of the Lebanese press and 
blogosphere relating to this issue since 2005. This analysis helped to capture the 
discourses justifying policy interventions, supported by mapping key controver-
sies, and identified the most visible forms of protest.
Energy Inequalities, Street Politics and Urban Grid Politics
Infrastructure, being at the core of the production and sustenance of the city, is 
directly involved in the production of urban inequalities and thus in the shaping 
of social and political hierarchies (Swyngedouw, 2004; McFarlane & Rutherford, 
2008; Graham, 2010). Without rejecting the structural dimensions of such domi-
nation, scholars have stressed that in everyday life such processes of establishing 
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social and political hierarchies do not go unchallenged. This pervasiveness of con-
testation demands a reorientation of research towards the agency of ‘minor’ actors, 
the sites and moments where and when protest and dissent is enacted, and how 
the political order can be challenged, shaken and even reversed (at least partially 
and temporarily), as occurred during the Arab Spring (Mitchell, 2002; Parker, 
2009; Bayat, 2012; Bayat, 2013). In the Arab world and beyond, street politics 
have emerged as a highly visible way of staging protest, with major squares and 
arteries becoming a symbol of the revolts (Swyngedouw, 2011). Yet, contesting 
the political order, and urban injustice through this, is not only a matter of street 
protest. It also involves dissenting through other forms of action (Bayat, 2009; 
Allegra et al., 2013): a more ordinary form of street politics (Bayat, 2012), often 
intersecting with a politics ‘from within the energy system’ (Mitchell, 2011: 12).
Timothy Mitchell’s (2011) book Carbon Democracy offers a useful framework 
to unpack the links between the specific materiality of dominant energies (such as 
coal or oil) and the democratic order. Mitchell (2011: 252–3) achieves this through 
‘follow[ing] closely a set of connections that were engineered over the course of 
a century between carbon fuels and certain kinds of democratic and undemocratic 
politics’. In this way, ‘exploring the properties of oil, the networks along which 
it flowed, and the connections established between the flows of energy, finance 
and other objects provides a way to understand how the relations between these 
various elements and forces were constructed’. In Mitchell’s analysis of energy 
flows in the twentieth century, the concentrated nature of coal and the large work-
force involved in its excavation and transportation gave workers the power to 
advance their democratic rights. Conversely, the greater fluidity and lightness of 
oil, together with the lower number of workers involved, allowed firms and oil 
states to circumvent and counter the power of democratic forces. Such mapping 
of energy circuits provides insights into the political and contested nature of the 
connections that allow the continued circulation of energy and capital at different 
points in the networks. A key advantage of Mitchell’s analysis is the unravel-
ling of the vulnerability or precariousness of these connections, to be understood 
as socially constructed and inherently political. Cupples’ (2011) analysis of pro-
tests against the privatisation of an electricity distribution utility in Nicaragua 
intersects and helps to transpose Mitchell’s work to the city scale. Like Mitchell, 
Cupples emphasises the political effects of the materiality of the network. Here 
this materiality plays out in various settlements as customers ‘tactically and cre-
atively enrol the nonhumans’ by tampering with electric meters, so as to disrupt a 
device that both symbolically and materially enacts the commodification of elec-
tricity (Cupples, 2011: 945).
In transposing the framework advanced by Mitchell and Cupples onto the urban 
level in Amman and Tunis, recent research has emphasised the vulnerability of 
a specific segment in electricity circuits: the ‘end of line’ (Verdeil, 2014). Com-
prised of transformer stations, poles and meters, this segment of the electricity 
infrastructure enables various actors to deploy their agencies and interact with the 
grid. In the context of the material and social vulnerability of the ‘end of line’, 
utility workers repair circuits, collect bills and fight illegal connections whilst 
dwellers and customers hook up lines and tamper with meters. Workers also use 
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their strategic position to disrupt the circuits of money and energy when they 
strike (Verdeil, 2014). This account of the ‘end of line’ is also applicable to the 
case of Beirut, yet it needs to be refined in two directions. First, the embedded-
ness of such struggles in urban space as well as of their political meaning and 
reach needs further consideration. While Cupples (2011) describes anti- neoliberal 
campaigning targeting electric meters, Bayat (2009) offers a wider understanding 
of street politics encompassing not only protests staged on streets and squares 
with explicitly political slogans but also ordinary practices in ‘back alleyways’ 
and popular neighbourhoods. These everyday practices, which he calls ‘the quiet 
encroachment of the ordinary’, may express more dissent than open protests; they 
are enacted through ‘non- movements’, or ‘collective actions of non- collective 
actors’ (Bayat, 2009: 14). In this respect, they are less politicised – which does 
not mean non- political. Following this line of thought, this chapter emphasises 
the forms of these political mobilisations (collective/group- specific/individual) 
and their democratic content, that is, their capacity to advance social rights and to 
define a common future.
Second, it is necessary to go beyond the very material end of the grid (the ‘end 
of line’), and understand not only the politics of disrupting circuits but also that of 
imposing one’s power on the grid. Mitchell (2011), analysing the geopolitics of oil 
production and supply, shows how energy firms built cartels in order to control 
supply and through this oil prices. Such form of control over the network could 
succeed only thanks to alliances with actors – external to the energy circuit – that 
exert forms of sovereign control over the territory crossed by the flow of oil. These 
(imperial and business) actors helped dismiss attempts at building an international 
and democratic sovereignty over the oilfields at the end of First World War and 
during the Interwar period, continuing the control and expanding repression of 
workers’ unions. Such powers, such as the royal family of Saudi Arabia, are to 
this day considered to be among the least democratic forces in the world. These 
notions of alliances, of building local power over territories to enforce the politi-
cal security of energy circuits, and the regressive politics this entails, is used to 
analyse the alternative electricity grids that Beirutis resort to during power cuts, 
since they are organised as small local- level monopolies.
In what follows, the chapter successively examines the uneven geography of 
accessing electricity and the associated establishment of relationships of dom-
ination linked to supply within the Lebanese electricity crisis. It also looks at 
strategies of resistance to domination based on a struggle around the control of 
the electricity grid and the new relations of power built around emerging informal 
territorialised electricity grids that spread across the city. This highlights the vari-
ous ways in which urban electricity is politicised, and if and how it contributes to 
reconfigure the existing political order.
Uneven Geography of Electricity Supply and the Sectarian Order
For years, an electricity crisis has been at the core of Lebanese politics. In 2010 
the electrical output of EDL, the national public utility, amounted to about 
1,500 MW – signi¿cantly less than the estimated 2,300 MW required to satisfy 
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demand (Bassil, 2010). The electricity supply suffers from heavy shortages and 
long lasting power cuts on a daily basis (8–12 hours a day on average in 2012). 
EDL records heavy annual losses ($1.5 billion in 2008–10), constituting a major 
part of the ballooning state de¿cit. 2n the one hand, the rising price of imported 
fuels is not reÀected in the tariffs paid by customers. 2n the other, rampant cor-
ruption, theft and poor collection rates aggravate the company’s ¿nancial burden 
(Verdeil, 2009; Hasbani, 2011). Numerous policies have attempted to reform 
the sector and since 2002 successive governments have discussed the privatisa-
tion of the electricity sector. However, until 2011 the key interventions in the 
state- owned utility were limited to reducing investments and retrenching the 
workforce as the company moved to using contractual workers, often employed 
through clientelistic channels.
The current electricity supply in Lebanon is marked by strong inequalities, par-
ticularly noticeable through both an uneven geography of access and the unequal 
subsidies that several groups of customers enjoy. Such an energy configuration 
further reinforces the country’s existing inequalities, while solidifying the sectar-
ian divide that characterises Lebanese politics. The most striking feature of this 
uneven supply lies in the uneven service which favours Beirut over other parts 
of the country. Since 2006, Beirut receives about 21 hours of power a day, while 
elsewhere in the country daily power cuts can reach 12 to 16 hours. The contrast 
is particularly felt in the city’s immediate suburbs, differentially affecting people 
living in the same urban fabric since areas outside the municipal boundary – from 
one side of a street to the other – live with very different conditions of electricity 
access and supply (Figure 8.2).
Favouring Beirut over the rest of the country is undoubtedly a political choice, 
though no reason has ever been publicly given. From the point of view of the utility, 
this choice secures its financial income since Beirut’s customers are responsible 
for the highest share of electricity consumption in the country, with little electricity 
theft and non- payment recorded there. The most obvious economic implication of 
this arrangement is the protection of the country’s main economic sectors (banks, 
administration and hotels) from power cuts, in this way securing the private inter-
ests of their owners. Yet the choice of prioritizing Beirut’s municipal boundary can 
also have political undertones. Between 2009 and 2013 the Ministry of Energy 
was in the hands of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), a Christian party claim-
ing to rationalise the management of the sector. Allied with the Shia parties of 
Amal and Hezbollah, the FPM claimed – and seemed to have – the political means 
to push for a more balanced distribution of supply. This move would have also fit-
ted the political interest of the alliance, since all three parties had their power bases 
in the suburbs (north and east for the FPM; south for the Shia). But the national 
level Council of Ministers rejected two such attempts. This failure highlights the 
complex nexus of business and elite interests inside the governing coalition that 
resisted the change.
Technical factors also play a role in the configuration of an uneven geogra-
phy of electricity, aggravating the already unbalanced official supply schedule. 
Indeed, lack of investment in infrastructure alongside sprawling and overcrowded 
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suburban sectors during and after the civil war have resulted in an undersized dis-
tribution grid, increasing local shortages. For example, in Dahiyeh, the southern 
suburb of Beirut, technical limitations restrict supply whilst the not so distant city 
centre enjoys extensive surplus capacity (Wehbe, 2012). As a consequence, Beirut 
Figure 8.2 Map of Beirut, its suburbs and Mount Lebanon
Source: the author
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dwellers – on average the wealthiest in the country – are also the best supplied; the 
lower- income dwellers of the suburbs bear the bulk of the shortages.
This territorial and social inequality is reinforced by the subsidy system gov-
erning electricity tariffs. The tariff has not been updated since 1996, while the 
price of fuel – purchased on the international market – has more than quadrupled. 
Electricity is sold well under the cost of generating it (Bassil, 2010). This means 
that those who consume the most receive a correspondingly larger subsidy from 
the state budget. Beirut dwellers, wealthier and better supplied than their suburban 
counterparts, enjoy a larger share of this indirect form of government aid, though 
no data is available to estimate it. Residents with infrequent and disrupted elec-
tricity are increasingly forced to use costly generators (World Bank, 2009). The 
resulting imbalance is augmented by the financial burden that those with limited 
and intermittent electricity access have to bear in order to alleviate power cuts: 
purchasing electricity from privately owned generators running on diesel, the cost 
of which is non- subsidized and suffers from international price fluctuations.
In Beirut, the uneven supply and distribution of electricity across the city region 
has prompted numerous popular mobilisations in public spaces. Yet such pro-
tests have never coalesced into a unified movement; instead, they have served 
sectarian and local political agendas, reinforcing the city’s current political frag-
mentation. Street demonstrations against darkness have taken two forms. First, 
and less frequent, are big demonstrations backed by political parties at symbolic 
urban spaces. This form of protest can be exemplified by a demonstration that took 
place in Chiyah, on the former demarcation line between East Christian Beirut and 
the Southern suburbs, on the 27th of January 2008. This was mostly attended by 
Shia people from Dahiyeh, probably those most affected by the power cuts at the 
time. The protest resulted in riots and other forms of violence, with nine deaths 
and accusations between opposing political parties about the cause of the conflict. 
Government backers claimed that Hezbollah, the main political force in Dahiyeh 
acting at a time of fierce political struggle, wanted to use this event as a way to 
pressure the government, in effect overlooking the reality of the uneven service 
supply and the legitimacy of the protesters’ claims. Yet Hezbollah itself, appar-
ently losing control over the mobilisation, made efforts to calm down popular 
anger and reaffirm a patron- client relationship by bringing in new generators to 
the suburb (Chit, 2009).
The second form of protest against darkness relates to small neighbourhood- 
scale protests where mobs, apparently without the formal backing of political 
parties or other organisations, disrupt mobility and circulation in the city by burn-
ing tyres in important thoroughfares. In their demands, protesters, mostly young 
and deprived, make few connections with wider economic and social issues such 
as joblessness. The political elite respond to such protests in sectarian and divisive 
terms. For example, the response of the Minister of Energy and Water, Gebran 
Bassil, to the street mobilisations that characterised the heat wave of August 2010 
reveals a common type of sectarian politics when dealing the uneven condition 
of service access in the city. Bassil, a member of the Christian FPM, declared: ‘In 
some districts, protests against power cuts are politically motivated’; slamming 
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Muslim districts, he added, ‘it is not permitted for a region where illegal hook- ups 
multiply to protest against power cuts. . . . It appears that Christian regions pay 
their due more than others, but it’s the truth’ (L’Orient- Le Jour, 2010).
These sectarian narratives, which permeate public discussions about the city’s 
unequal access to basic services, overlook a more nuanced account of the geogra-
phy and sociology of electricity fraud; one that highlights the role of local political 
leadership in covering illegal grid connections (Verdeil, 2009), and one which, 
stepping away from blanket approaches, considers the quantities consumed. In 
2009 the Head of the Higher Privatisation Committee, a government body estab-
lished to support the privatisation of a variety of public services and entities, 
acknowledged that ‘richer customers that have higher electricity bills cost the 
state more money’ than illegal dwellers who ‘steal to light a small apartment’ 
(Hayek, 2009: 31). Several industrial operations, leisure clubs and even political 
leaders have been singled out by the press for illegal electricity hook- ups or lack 
of bill payment. This acknowledgement by the Higher Privatisation Committee 
also means that fraudulent big customers, even in small numbers, are responsible 
for a large amount of lost income for the electricity utility, outweighing ‘small fry’ 
fraudulent customers whatever religion they belong to. However, like with many 
other social struggles in the country (Abi Yaghi & Catusse, 2011), the sectarian 
discourse prevents an alternative approach to electricity loss and access, particu-
larly obscuring the class dimensions of the problem.
Grid- Embedded Resistance
The lack of ef¿cacy of voicing dissent in the public sphere prompts an examina-
tion of other forms of politicisation of electric issues that are emerging in the 
current crisis: the use of the material and social con¿guration of the grid itself 
in order to advance social and political claims around service provision. In these 
situations, actors involved in conÀicts with the state utility try to reap advantage 
from the technical- political vulnerability of urban electricity circuits. In contrast 
with the more universal claims for access and equality examined in the previous 
 section, here claims tend to be more group or place- speci¿c. Not all of these forms 
of resistance are successful, and the struggles appear to fail to open new demo-
cratic horizons for all citizens. Conversely, such forms of grid protest can feed 
more divisive politics, be it sectarian or class based.
One example of such grid- embedded resistance is provided by an examina-
tion of how workers in the electricity distribution sector exert a form of power 
that originates from their strategic location and function inside the grid. Between 
May and September 2012, EDL contractual workers – enrolled on a daily basis 
and without social benefits – fought for more than four months against a law that 
would contract electric distribution to private firms and turn them into employees 
of these new businesses. Workers claimed a right to be public employees offi-
cially working for the publicly owned utility. They feared the law was a first step 
towards the dismantling and privatisation of the utility company. In response, they 
implemented a strike during the summer months, a time where the usual power 
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cuts are particularly long and heavily felt. Workers stopped repairing disrupted 
infrastructures damaged because of strong electricity demand, further aggravating 
the power cuts experienced by users. They retained payments collected from cus-
tomers, causing the company an additional loss of income and preventing it from 
buying the fuel required to generate electricity. In their actions, they were making 
use of their position as indispensable pivots in the operation of the grid. Though 
their fight was unpopular and they received no support from the electricity union 
(which limits its representation to workers that enjoy the status of civil servants), 
their actions enabled them to reach an agreement with the government. Contrac-
tual workers were promised a facilitated recruitment procedure for their formal 
integration within the utility. Whilst this struggle had a clear class dimension, 
its sectarian dimension cannot be dismissed: since the majority of the workers 
belonged to the Shia denomination of Islam, Christian politicians opposed the 
agreement with the argument that it would create a sectarian imbalance.
In contrast to that workers’ struggle, the everyday fights of dwellers in some 
informal neighbourhoods to secure and defend electricity access proves to be much 
more precarious and politically disappointing: the tampering of electricity meters. 
The ‘end of the grid’, where electric power is transformed from medium into low 
voltage, is a liminal space where connections between utility networks, customers 
and electricity workers take place. Its sub- stations and transformers are physically 
located within the neighbourhoods, and whilst entering (or tampering with) them 
can be dangerous, they are easier to access than any other segments of the grid. 
After the transformers, electric power flows through low- voltage lines towards 
the dwelling, and skilled people can relatively easily hook up illegal or informal 
connections (Zaki, 2011). The connection materialises once again through the 
electricity meter, which itself can be targeted, bypassed and tampered with in 
various ways. Tampering with meters is an uncommon practice in Lebanon since 
the civil war. Non- technical losses, once estimated over 50 per cent (Badelt & 
Yehia, 2000), now amount to about 23 per cent of the total output (Hasbani, 2011). 
However, though the utility has taken significant steps in order to eliminate meter 
tampering, the practice increases each time the political bickering in the country 
results in a governmental stalemate. They are actions that take advantage of the 
physical vulnerability of the network, despite new anti- theft technologies such as 
twisted wires and sealed meters which, after the civil war, made illegal hook- ups 
more difficult.
Yet, the connection between the network and the customer is not configured 
solely through physical devices. It also materialises in the periodic meeting of 
collector and customer, when the collector reads the meter and distributes the 
bill to the customer. Here again the customer can display its power by refusing to 
pay in time. In doing so, they expose the household to the possibility of being cut 
off – excluded from the grid. But such a move can only be achieved through a team 
of utility workers capable of visiting the building for the purpose of physically 
disconnecting the line. Since broader power dynamics frame these relationships, 
these micro- resistances and the possibility of disconnection cannot be understood 
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outside of the overlapping political geography of the city. Such practices of resis-
tance, for instance, are easier in areas that enjoy political backing by local forces 
usually connected to powerful parties. It means that grid- embedded resistance 
is entangled in classical patron- client relationships. Sometimes, even dwellers 
that don’t enjoy such protection oppose a physical resistance to the anti- fraud 
teams. The press regularly reports on such incidents (L’Orient- Le Jour, 2004; The 
Daily Star, 2009). In such cases, Bayat’s suggestion of ‘politics of redress’, or 
the collective action required in order to defend the gains achieved through the 
‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ (Bayat, 2009: 58), may be useful. In troubled 
political times, as has been the case in Lebanon since 2005, these resistances 
have prevented or limited crackdown campaigns, a phenomenon acknowledged 
by state authorities. For instance, on the 19th December 2006, L’Orient- Le Jour 
cited Mohamad Safadi, acting Minister of Energy, speaking of an ‘increase of 
power theft from the grid, [alongside] EDL employees being unable to report or 
monitor the infractions, given the current situation in the country’ (L’Orient- Le 
Jour, 2006).
In contrast to the Nicaraguan campaign of resistance against privatisation 
described by Cupples (2011), tampering with electricity meters in Beirut is a form 
of grid resistance that is not explicitly accompanied by clear demands expressing 
a political meaning. Dwellers in Raml al- ‘Ali, one of the poorest informal neigh-
bourhoods in the southern suburb of Beirut, reported poverty and the high cost of 
electricity as the main reason for illegal (or pirate) electricity hook- ups (Khayat, 
2008). Dwellers in the neighbourhood did not expect an improvement in the provi-
sion of electricity, and made do as they could. Khayat’s survey highlighted a lack 
of solidarity between dwellers regarding hook- up practices. For instance, they 
prefer to hook- up to a wire already illegally connected to the grid in order not 
be ticketed. Dwellers had frequent disputes about the responsibility of incidents 
caused by hook- ups – such as overloads, which can create long lasting power 
cuts – because the utility company did not provide its repair services in such cases 
in order to ‘punish the pirates’, as an engineer once expressed (interview, Beirut, 
June 2006).
The capacity of electricity workers to disrupt the system and gain bargain-
ing power to improve labour conditions, coupled with the vulnerability of the 
modern metropolis to power cuts, echoes Timothy Mitchell’s (2011) arguments 
around the power of coal workers and their ability to fight for democratic rights. 
Similarly, the dwellers’ strategy of ‘pirate’ hook- ups and meter tampering rest on 
acquiring a power of action ‘from within the new energy system’ (Mitchell, 2011: 
12). Both agents target vulnerable points in the electricity circuit of the city, and 
exploit a favourable balance of power in certain places. Yet these forms of resis-
tance are precarious and often depend upon patron- client relations that forgo the 
possibility of structural improvements. Moreover, it appears that such actions do 
not express common strategies and rely mostly on individual and opportunistic 
behaviour, rather than on a collectively devised project of enhancing rights to 
resource access.
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The Geographically Splintered Politics of Informal  
Electricity Grids
This last section turns to another case of electricity politics in Beirut: the informal 
grids established around privately run diesel generators. This pervasive form of 
supply, which has spread since the civil war (Awada, 1988; Davie, 1991), now 
constitutes a consolidated form of service provision in Lebanese cities, foremost 
in Beirut and its suburbs. Born out the need to rely on emergency sources dur-
ing long power cuts, these electricity networks proliferated initially as individual 
solutions and later as collective responses operating at the scale of the building of 
private ¿rms and even entire neighbourhoods. Originally run in a spirit of solidar-
ity, they have gradually taken a commercial orientation with segregating effects. 
By 2007 and 2008 it was estimated that private generation in Lebanon amounted 
to 34 per cent of total electricity production, with 56 per cent of households rely-
ing on private suppliers for lighting (Central Administration of Statistics, 2008; 
World Bank, 2009). Since interruptions in the average daily supply of electricity 
have only worsened, particularly in Beirut where people used to enjoy almost full 
supply until 2006, this ¿gure has probably increased. The use of electricity genera-
tors and their associated micro- grids provide a relevant case study to evaluate the 
governance of the new social relations shaping resource vulnerability in the city 
and the failures of its infrastructural network.
Widely used, private electricity generators and their grids are not only tem-
porary and superficial fixes to the daily interruptions of service characteristic of 
the city. They have constituted an infrastructural geography deeply embedded 
in the everyday, which restructures the urban fabric according to its material, 
social and political characteristics and produces its own form of politics. These 
wire networks servicing dwellings are spread chaotically from generators located 
in convenient places in the neighbourhood – such as vacant spaces or abandoned 
factories. At the dwelling, they connect to the internal network via a manually 
operated switcher that is activated whenever there is a power cut (Figure 8.3). 
Gradually, these informal grids have concealed new devices, slowly embedding 
them into other urban objects. For example, in new buildings, a secondary net-
work parallel to the official one runs inside the walls, using automatic switchers 
that enable connection and disconnection from the formal grid as required. Mar-
keting material for new gated communities in Beirut speak of 24/7 water and 
electricity delivery as distinctive features, achieved thanks to generators run by 
real estate developers. The generator has been normalised as a basic service, invis-
ible to the user, just like public infrastructure has been black- boxed and buried 
over time (Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2000). In new buildings, notably in high- end 
neighbourhoods, the arrangement of generators is embedded within the overall 
building design, in this way avoiding or limiting nuisances such as the smoke of 
the generators for final users (Figure 8.4). This trend toward business- oriented 
grids has spurred the development of new commercial services, for instance, 
through differentiated levels of supply – exhibiting an ability to incorporate and 
respond to the variable needs and capacities of, for example, smaller or poorer 
customers. Consistent with the advancement of a splintering urbanism (Graham & 
15041-0042-FullBook.indd   166 11-02-2016   11:38:22 AM
Beirut 167
Marvin, 2001), the new grids mirror existing social hierarchies and, to an extent, 
reinforce the city’s inequalities.
The emergence of these new infrastructural capabilities has produced its own 
politics. The state, still promising 24/7 electricity, has never recognised the 
Figure 8.3 The grid of a generator in Zaatriyeh, a popular suburb east of Beirut
Source: the author
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generators sector; yet, it has never repressed it. Generators, as ‘grey spaces’, 
remain between the whiteness of the law and the darkness of what is supposed 
to be demolished or expelled (Yiftachel, 2009; Gabillet, 2010). Such grey spaces 
are temporary, at the same time tolerated and condemned, always waiting to be 
Figure 8.4 A generator serving a middle class building in Beirut, 2014
Source: the author
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cleared. As such, they can be used as a tool for governing without granting rights 
to users; there are no rights attached to a service that should not exist. Electricity 
via these small generators has become a profitable business abiding to no rules. 
Depicting generator businesses as mafias is common (Batah, 2011; Mohsen, 2012), 
a reference related both to the nature of their profits – which escape any kind of 
tax and state regulation – as much as to the abuses committed against clients and 
competitors. The businesses tend to organise spatially as a local monopoly, are 
defended by violent means and clients have little recourse against wrongdoings 
such as unjustified pricing and defaults. Rumours of politicians being involved in 
the business in their regional strongholds are numerous. Turning back to Mitchell 
(2011), who emphasises how building monopolies operate as a means to control 
output and price on the energy market, it is clear that in Beirut this cannot be done 
solely from ‘within the network’ but only through alliances with local political 
forces and the exploitation of local power configurations.
The case of Hazmieh, a middle class suburb of about 30,000 inhabitants in the 
southeast of the capital, illustrates a common situation where the owners of gen-
erators operate their business with the backing of the municipality under a laissez 
faire approach open to bribes and corruption. Prices for electricity are higher here 
than in other parts of the city. Voter power and the possibility of pressure from 
the electorate for the regulation of generators is out of the question, since most 
citizens only recently settled in the suburb and are not registered on the local vot-
ing lists. This leaves residents vulnerable to higher electricity costs, a common 
condition in Lebanon (Favier, 2001; Verdeil, 2005). The case of Jbeil illustrates 
another example of these electric politics (Gabillet, 2010). This town of about 
40,000 habitants is less a suburb of Beirut than a small tourist city in the outskirts 
of the metropolis. There, the firm Karhaba Jbeil (Electricity of Jbeil) holds a 
private concession dating back to the French mandate, formally replacing EDL as 
supplier of electricity. Several informal generator businesses operated in the city, 
but a mayor elected in 2004 decided to clear the landscape of these technologies 
in order to beautify the city. He pressured the operators of generators to withdraw 
their electricity from the market by blocking their use of the poles that belonged 
to the municipality. Instead he pushed Karhaba Jbeil to become a monopolistic 
actor. The mayor was able to deliver this policy through a deal with the supplier 
to keep the electricity costs low and forestall attempts to re- install the generators.
The case of Borj Hammoud, an Armenian suburb just outside Beirut with about 
100,000 inhabitants, offers another illustration of the strong role municipalities 
can play in regulating the private grids (Gabillet, 2010). Since 2010, in response 
to calls by civic and consumer associations for regulating the sector, the  Ministry 
of Energy issues a monthly suggested tariff for their output and leaves open the 
option for municipal governments to enforce this pricing. Borj Hammoud has 
been among the pioneers. Local police have been enrolled to monitor the genera-
tors output. Both the use of public poles and the location of generators in public 
spaces are negotiated between owners and the municipality. But the negotia-
tion also includes electricity prices. Decisions are made public through a local 
Armenian TV channel. This innovative municipal involvement in the emerging 
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micro- grid of the generators rests on re- taking control of the grid, via poles, wires 
and even meters for each generator. Arguably, this type of municipal involvement 
is also linked to the political agenda of the Tachnag Party, the major Armenian 
political power in the country, to maintain a local political hegemony and thus to 
prevent conflicts around an important issue for its constituents. Such processes 
are less about granting rights than de facto ruling a service that remains outside 
of the remit of the law.
The actions of Borj Hammoud lay at the intersection of holding power on the 
grid and a territorial power that not only permits the enforcement of the monop-
oly but also regulates relations between producers and customers. The case of 
Hazmieh is one where the owners of the informal grid operate with the sup-
port of a local power, whereas the case of Jbeil illustrates a more interventionist 
approach, but where the private firm is given free rein. In all cases, citizens have 
limited rights and few means to defend themselves against the power of these new 
grids. Local voting rights provide little leverage, given the disconnection between 
the place of residence and the place of voting, a common issue in Lebanon. One 
of the only situations where citizens can exert their rights is in the context of a 
commercial relationship, as is the case of high- end condominiums and gated com-
munities. Here neighbourhood associations can, for instance, cancel the services 
of a service provider whose performance does not fit the agreed standard. But such 
actions are restricted to a wealthy minority (Glasze, 2003). The politics created 
by private energy grids are not only highly uneven between social classes, but 
also geographically fragmented according to specific local political contexts. This 
highlights the impossibility of a shared governance of electricity at the level of the 
city, illustrating, to return to the cartoon of Abdelhalim Hammoud (Figure 8.1), 
the infrastructural disintegration and meltdown of the country.
Conclusion
This chapter mapped the disruptions and recon¿gurations of electricity circuits 
in the Greater Beirut region, and demonstrated how such disruptions both reÀect 
and create particular con¿gurations of power. To do so, it built on Timothy Mitch-
ell’s (2011) project to follow the tracks of energy, their vulnerabilities and the 
struggles that take advantage of them. It also built on Cupples’ (2011) commit-
ment to unravel the precarious agencies involved and the enrolment of material 
devices in the process of advancing social rights. The analysis allowed an under-
standing of the kind of politics such endeavours produce: the manifestation of 
discomforts via protests and dissent in the public space, highlighting collective, 
‘non- collective’ (Bayat, 2009), corporatist and individual forms.
Through this conceptual approach, the chapter discussed what such mobilisa-
tions managed to achieve, alongside their political reach in view of advancing 
democratic rights. This can be summed up through a typology of grid politics 
based on their ability to disrupt and alter the power relations built in and around 
electricity supply (Table 8.1). A central concern here is to reflect on the specific-
ity and efficiency of forms of political action which, paraphrasing Mitchell and 
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Cupples, work from within the energy system and tactically and creatively enrol 
the nonhumans. These have varying degrees of success in advancing democratic 
rights in the face of expanding forms of privatisation and, more globally, the sub-
jugation of citizens to a prevailing unequal socio- political order.
In the context of Beirut, the typology distinguishes four key domains. The first 
one is the politicisation of electricity provision through various kinds of street 
protests. This fails to exert sufficient pressure on the political order and is handled 
rather through sectarian means. The second domain, the struggle of workers, high-
lights the power of those who, operating from within the power grid, disrupt flows 
of electricity and capital, and therefore exploit to their advantage the fact that 
electricity is an indispensable infrastructure of life in the metropolis. Just as in the 
case analysed by Mitchell (2011), such conflicts can advance democratic rights. 
In parallel, these workers claimed the defence of a national cause – the public role 
of a national utility, threatened by unbundling and privatisation in the electricity 
sector.
A third domain of politics, the struggle to access electricity through illegal 
means in remote suburbs, illustrates an attempt to use the same kind of power from 
‘within the energy system’. But in contrast with the previous case, these achieve-
ments are more precarious. They depend upon local political support – often 
involving sectarian politics – or can be sustained only as long as the political stale-
mate lasts. It is more an opportunistic way for disenfranchised people to access 
free electricity in a particular local context rather than a struggle with a broader 
social scope. Such fights are plagued by internal strife and a lack of solidarity.
A fourth and final domain of politics analysed in the chapter is related to the 
informal grids supplying power from generators. These grids echo other informal 
Table 8.1 The various types of grid politics in Lebanon
Cases 
examined
Type of 
actors
Type of claims Form of politics (street/
from within the grid)
Political 
horizon of 
the struggle
Burning 
Tyres/Mass 
demonstration
Citizens/ 
customers
Right to light Street protest Sectarian 
politics
Utility workers 
movement
Workers Right to 
formal job 
(job tenure + 
bene¿ts)
Disrupting the grid  
(+ street protest)
Defence of 
the national 
utility
Informal 
dwellers hook- 
ups and meter 
tampering
Customers Access to light 
(not claimed 
as a right)
Individual quiet encroach-
ment/collective politics of 
redress using power from 
within and around the grid
Overcoming 
and defend-
ing local 
advantages
Regulating 
neighbourhood 
generators
Municipality Access to light 
(not granted as 
a right)
Control on the grid Local poli-
tics (often 
sectarian)
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infrastructure services in cities in the global South, with two distinct features. 
First, they do not generate a place- specific form of service provision, to be found 
only in poor areas bypassed by infrastructure. Since power cuts are more or less 
ubiquitous (though their duration reflects uneven access), private grids are not 
located in specific areas but everywhere in the city. Second, they coexist with the 
main electricity grid, using some of its infrastructure, notably poles and neutral 
lines. Therefore, they are not class- specific, as both poor and rich makes use of 
such informal infrastructures. One of the more salient political features of such a 
networked system lies in the emergence of a violent localised form of electric cap-
italism, constructing and exploiting the position of power that local monopolies 
grant to their private owners. Only the municipalities can challenge this, thanks 
to their level of territorial control and, hence, control of the grid itself. This case 
highlights the interface between territorial power and the power from within the 
grid. In some configurations, local policies can be less detrimental to the citizens- 
customers, though it cannot be conceived of as really democratic but rather less 
regressive. In the Lebanese case, nevertheless, the splintering dynamics that are at 
work at the local scale do not produce any converging direction in these struggles 
and are blurring any shared metropolitan and national horizon.
The political struggles examined in this chapter highlight the deep inequali-
ties produced by the long lasting electricity crisis in Beirut. Achieving energy 
justice, particularly where democratic forms of politics are significantly impeded, 
can pass through other kinds of politics, combining grid power and local territorial 
power in order to disrupt circuits, redress eviction threats or protect advantageous 
configurations of access. This involves scrutinizing the minor human and non- 
human agencies that are too often overlooked or dismissed. Nevertheless, these 
forces remain entangled in divisive schemes of power that prevent them from 
achieving any major reshuffling of the political system or long lasting changes to 
the electricity system.
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